Choosing one's preferences by Lecouteux, Guilhem
Choosing one’s preferences
Guilhem Lecouteux
To cite this version:
Guilhem Lecouteux. Choosing one’s preferences. cahier de recherche 2013-19. 2013. <hal-
00864704>
HAL Id: hal-00864704
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00864704
Submitted on 23 Sep 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOOSING ONE’S PREFERENCES 
 
 
 
Guilhem LECOUTEUX 
 
 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
Cahier n° 2013-19 
 
 
 
 
                              ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE                       
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 
 
 
DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIE 
Route de Saclay 
91128 PALAISEAU CEDEX 
(33) 1 69333033 
http://www.economie.polytechnique.edu/ 
mailto:chantal.poujouly@polytechnique.edu 
 
 
Choosing one’s preferences
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Abstract
A central assumption in economics is that individuals are rational in the sense that they
seek to satisfy their preferences, by choosing the action that maximizes a utility function
that represents those preferences. However, it appears that in strategic interaction with
other rational agents, the individuals can benefit from strategic commitments. We deter-
mine the set of games for which strategic commitments can be beneficial to the players, by
building an analytical framework in which players can choose their own preferences before
playing a game. We show that players make strategic commitments as soon as there exists
a Stackelberg equilibrium that is not a Nash equilibrium, but also that there always exists
at least one set of preference relations at the equilibrium such that a Nash equilibrium is
implemented. We then show that the possibility of making strategic commitments generates
cooperative behaviours in the case of supermodular games. Journal of Economic Literature
Classification Numbers: C72, D01.
Keywords: strategic commitment, choice of preferences, Stackelberg, supermodularity.
1 Introduction
A disturbing issue of rational choice theory is that the theory can be self-defeating. There in-
deed exists situations in which a person who is perfectly rational, trying to maximize her payoff,
can achieve in fine a lower outcome that a less rational individual. Sugden (1991) considers for
instance two types of games for which rational choice can lead to self-defeating behaviours: co-
ordination games, such as the Hi-Lo game, and games of commitment, such as the Toxin puzzle
(Kavka, 1983). The counter-intuitive implication of this observation is that, in those specific
games, if an individual wants to achieve her objective, then it is in her interest to adopt an ap-
parently non rational behaviour: being irrational can therefore be rational in those games. The
idea that the individuals can benefit from strategic commitments — i.e. voluntary deviations
from the rational behaviour — have been suggested by Schelling (1960), and already discussed
by Stackelberg (1934), with the introduction of timing in oligopoly. Different approaches have
then been developed in order to study specific kinds of commitments, such as strategic delegation
∗E´cole Polytechnique, Laboratoire d’e´conome´trie PREG-CECO (CNRS UMR 7176), E-mail: guilhem.
lecouteux@polytechnique.edu. Earlier versions of this article were presented to the X-CREST microeconomics
seminar at E´cole Polytechnique, the Economics Internal Workshop at University of East Anglia, and the lunch
seminar Theory, Organisation and Markets at Paris School of Economics. I thank the participants in those semi-
nars for their comments, and my PhD advisors Francis Bloch and Robert Sugden for numerous and constructive
discussions.
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(Fershtman and Kalai, 1997, Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001, Sengul et al., 2012), the evolution of
preferences (Guth and Yaari, 1992, Samuelson, 2001, Heifetz et al., 2007), but also the role of
emotions (Franck, 1987, 1988). In addition, some experimental results suggest that players can
learn to make the optimal strategic commitment (Poulsen and Roos, 2012).
We can however notice that those different approaches focus on a specific type of commitment,
such as evolutionary stable payoff distortions, contract with third parties or — in the case of
strategic delegation — specific mechanisms such as the provision of incentives or the allocation
of decision rights (Sengul et al., 2012, p.387). We suggest here adopting a slightly different
approach: we will not consider a specific mechanism that could enable the implementation of
a strategic commitment, but we will define the conditions under which a strategic commitment
can be beneficial. In particular, we develop a notion of equilibrium that is immune to strategic
commitments, i.e. a strategy profile such that no players can make a strategic commitment in
order to increase her own welfare. The interest of this notion compared to the other approaches
is that such an equilibrium is immune against any strategic commitment, whereas previous works
usually focused on a specific range of strategic commitment, such as payoff distortions.
The main feature of the theories of strategic commitment is the distinction between on the
one hand the relation that determines the choice of the individual, and on the other the relation
that determines her outcome. In this paper, we keep a similar distinction while distinguishing
between preferences and welfare. We refer to the idea of a total subjective comparative evaluation
in order to define both notions:
“To say that Jill prefers x to y is to say that when Jill has thought about everything
she takes to bear on how much she values x and y, Jill ranks x above y. [...] Because
Jill’s total subjective ranking does not leave out anything that she regards as relevant
to the evaluation of alternatives, it combines with beliefs to determine her choices.”
(Hausman, 2012, p.34)
We define a preference relation as the relation over the set of actions that determines the
choice of the individual, integrating among other things possible strategic commitments. We
define a welfare relation as the relation over the set of actions that would have determined the
choice of the individual if she was not able to make strategic commitments: the welfare relation
therefore represents the “true” preferences of the individual, in the sense that it is this last re-
lation that will determine her outcome. We must notice here that phenomena such as altruism
or spite — considered for instance in the evolutionary approach as dispositions that create a
wedge between the preferences and the payoff —, as well as ethical or religious commitments,
are already integrated in the evaluation of the outcomes in terms of welfare. Our point is that a
strategic commitment is only a deformation of the preferences that can help achieving a higher
level of welfare, whereas altruism is probably more an end in itself, and should be integrated in
the welfare of the individual. As argued by Hausman (2012), the logical properties of compara-
tive judgements imply that these welfare and preference relations meet the standard axioms of
rationality of completeness and transitivity. It is therefore possible to represent them respectively
by a welfare function and by a utility function.
The central element of our approach is the idea that the players are able to choose their own
preferences in a pre-commitment game. We justify this assumption by arguing that it provides
a more accurate theory of what should be a rational behaviour. The main assumption con-
cerning human behaviour in economics is indeed that individuals are rational in the sense that
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they choose the actions that best satisfy their ends: we have therefore an instrumental theory
of rationality. This implies that we do not need to question the ends of the individual, but only
the choice of the means that are at her disposal1.
If we consider rational individuals whose end is the maximization of their own welfare, they
should choose the procedure that enables them to get the highest level of welfare. In particular,
it means that if maximizing one’s welfare function leads to a self-defeating behaviour, then an
individual who maximizes her own welfare can achieve a lower level of welfare than one who
does not. If we consider that the individuals are rational and want to choose the strategy that
give them the highest level of welfare, then it can be rational to commit oneself to maximize a
different function than one’s own welfare function. An equilibrium notion in game theory that
enables players to choose preferences different from their welfare can therefore offer a better
model of rational behaviour than Nash equilibrium, which presupposes that rational individuals
are committed to maximize their own welfare function. Indeed, when the strategy of the other
players is given, maximizing one’s welfare is probably the best procedure a player can choose in
order to get the highest possible level of welfare (it is the definition of a Nash equilibrium). We
should however notice that in a game, it is not the chosen strategies, but the welfare functions
(i.e. the functions the players want to maximize in fine) that are common knowledge: the players
try therefore to maximize their welfare, given the objective of the other players, and not given
the strategy of the other players. As rational individuals, it can therefore be in their interest
to commit themselves to the maximization of a utility function which is not their welfare function.
We will therefore model the choice of preferences as follows: individuals are characterized
by their welfare relation over the space of strategies, and are able to commit themselves to act
according to a different relation than their welfare relation. Before choosing their strategies,
the players choose their preference relations in a pre-commitment game; they then choose their
strategy in order to satisfy those preferences in a second stage: we will therefore represent any
game by a two-stage game. A strategy profile in the second stage game and a set of prefer-
ence relations will be defined as a subgame perfect P-equilibrium if and only if this strategy
profile simultaneously maximizes the utility functions of the players, and the set of preference
relations which are represented by those utility functions constitute a Nash equilibrium of the
pre-commitment game.
Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, the players know that each player
can have an incentive in choosing a different preference relation than her welfare relation, and
therefore that a rational player can make a strategic commitment. If the structure of the game
— i.e. the set of players, the available actions and the welfare relations — is common knowledge,
then each player knows that the other players can choose a preference relation different from
their welfare relation. The two-stage game structure is therefore common knowledge. If it is
not the case, then it would be necessary to implement a mechanism such that each player can
publicly announce her preferences at the end of the precommitment game.
We firstly show that the players make strategic commitments as soon as one of them can get
a first mover advantage: this means that for a very large class of games, rational choice is self-
defeating, and it is in the interest of the players to commit themselves to adopt an apparently non
1We can find the origins of this tradition on the one hand in the work of Hume (1739), who suggested a
fundamental difference between passions (which cannot be subject to rational scrutiny) and reason, considering
that we cannot discuss the ends and motives of an individual, which are simply psychological phenomena; and on
the other hand in the definition of political economy of Mill (1843, Book VI, Chap.IX, par. 3), and the science of
logical actions of Pareto (Pareto (1909, chap.3 , par. 1) and Pareto (1916, par. 2146)), which restrict by definition
the scope of economics to the study of human actions guided by the pursuit of self-interest.
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rational behaviour. Our second result is that, despite the fact that the players will generally make
strategic commitments, any Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a second stage equilibrium.
This second result implies in particular that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is a sufficient
condition for the existence of a subgame perfect P-equilibrium. These results are quite general,
since the only assumption we make is that the welfare relation of the individuals is complete
and transitive, and can therefore be represented by an ordinal welfare function. We then show
in a more restricted framework that, in supermodular two-players games, both players have an
interest in choosing a cooperative utility function in the pre-commitment game. Conversely, at
least one player will choose competitive preferences in the case of a submodular two-players game.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we precisely present our framework of the
rational choice of preferences, before showing our two main results in section 3. We present in
section 4 an analysis of games with continuous strategy sets, and show that supermodularity
generates cooperative behaviours. Section 5 concludes.
2 Rational choice of one’s preferences
In this first section, we present our framework of the choice of one’s own preferences. We firstly
describe the two-stage game, and then define equilibrium notions for each stage of the two-stage
game.
2.1 Description of a game
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of players. Suppose that the set of actions Ai of each player
i is a non empty subset of a topological space Ei. Let Xi be the set of probability distributions
over Ai, i.e. the set of mixed strategies of player i. Denote by X =
∏
i∈N Xi the set of strategy
profiles in mixed strategies, and by XS = Πi∈SXi the cartesian product of all strategies of players
in a coalition S ⊂ N . For all coalition S ⊂ N , denote by −S the set −S = {j ∈ N | j 6∈ S}.
Let Pi ⊆ Xi × Xi denote a preference relation on the set Xi, and P = {Pi}i∈N a set of
preference relations on the sets Xi, ∀i ∈ N . Pi denotes the set of all the complete pre-orders
Pi ⊆ Xi×Xi. Let Wi ∈ Pi denote the welfare relation of the player i, i.e. the ranking of the set
Xi that corresponds to her total subjective comparative evaluation. We define a utility function
ui : X 7→ R as follows2:
∀x, x′ ∈ X, xPix′ ⇐⇒ ui(x|Pi) ≥ ui(x′|Pi). (1)
In particular, we can define a welfare function wi : X 7→ R:
wi(x) = ui(x|Wi). (2)
We assume that the welfare relations Wi, ∀i ∈ N , as well as the space of strategies X are
common knowledge. Γ denotes the game in normal form Γ = 〈N ; {Xi}i∈N ; {wi}i∈N 〉.
2We consider here only an ordinal notion of utility: the utility function ui is therefore defined up to a monotonic
transformation.
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We now assume that — before playing the game Γ — the individuals choose their preference
relation Pi. This means that for any game Γ in normal form, we can associate a two-stage game
G∗, in which the players choose in the first stage game G0 a relation Pi ∈ Pi, before playing in
a second stage the initial game Γ with the utility function ui(x|Pi). G denotes the second stage
game G = 〈N ; {Xi}i∈N ; {ui(x|Pi)}i∈N 〉.
2.2 Second stage game
In the second stage G of the two-stage game G∗, each player has chosen a preference relation
Pi ∈ Pi, and wants to satisfy those preferences. Each player therefore seeks to maximize one’s
utility, knowing that the others players want also to maximize their utility. We define a second
stage equilibrium as a strategy profile for which no player can unilaterally increase her own utility
by deviating from the equilibrium, and name it a Nash equilibrium for P:
Definition 2.1. Consider the game G defined in section 2.1. Let P ∈ P = {Pi}i∈N be a set of
preference relations. A strategy profile x¯ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium for P if and only if, ∀i ∈ N :
ui(x¯|Pi) ≥ ui(xi, x¯−i|Pi), ∀xi ∈ Xi. (3)
We can notice that a Nash equilibrium forW, withW = {Wi}i∈N the set of welfare relations,
is simply a Nash equilibrium. Since the set of preferences Pi is not restricted, we can have either
one, several or no second stage equilibrium. It is therefore possible to associate to each P ∈ P
the set of Nash equilibria for P, and therefore a set of vectors of welfare for each Nash equilibrium
for P.
Let X (P) denote the set of Nash equilibria for P. Let v(P) : P 7→ 2Rn , with 2Rn the power set
of Rn, denote a relation that associates to any set of preferences P ∈ P the set of vectors of
outcomes of the Nash equilibria for P:
v(P) = {(wi(x))i∈N | x ∈ X (P)} . (4)
2.3 First stage game
In the first stage game G0, each player chooses her own preference relation Pi ∈ Pi in order
to maximize in fine her welfare function wi(x). It has to be noticed that, since there exists
a difference between the function that determines the choice in the second stage game — the
utility function — and the one that determines the outcome that will be used in the first stage
game — the welfare function —, we cannot represent the two stage game as a one-stage game
in normal form3. We will therefore define an equilibrium notion based on the same idea than a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, but extended to Nash equilibria for P. This requires to solve
the issue of the possible non-uniqueness of second stage equilibrium.
3We can for instance notice that we cannot simply refer to the notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
since the second stage equilibrium is not a standard Nash equilibrium but a Nash equilibrium for P.
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The main idea we will use in order to tackle the possibility of none or several second stage equi-
libria will be to define the beliefs about the rule of selection of the second stage equilibrium. If
there exists several equilibria in the second stage game, then each player can have a belief about
the equilibrium that will effectively occur; if there exists no second stage equilibrium, then each
player can have a belief about the outcome she will effectively get. Since the non-existence of a
second stage equilibrium4 can be quite disturbing for a rational player — in the sense that she
does not know what she will play — we will assume that, when playing the first stage game, the
players expect their worst possible outcome in the second stage game if there is no second stage
equilibrium for a given P ∈ P. If there exists some strategy profiles in the first stage game such
that there exists several second stage equilibria, then we will represent as many first stage games
as there exists possible beliefs about the set of second stage equilibria that could effectively occur.
We will therefore study a multiplicity of well-defined first stage games — each one corresponding
to a possible first stage game if the rule of selection of the second stage equilibrium was known
— and not study a unique first stage game which could present none or several second stage
equilibria.
We define now a set of first stage games {G0,k}k∈K (it is possible to define this set of first
stage games for all games Γ, and therefore to treat any game Γ as a two-stage game G∗):
G0,k = 〈N,P, {vi,k}i∈N 〉, (5)
with ∀i ∈ N , vi,k : P 7→ R an indirect welfare function such that:
{vi,k(P)}i∈N ∈ v(P), if X (P) 6= ∅, (6)
vi,k(P) = min
x∈X
wi(x), if X (P) = ∅, (7)⋃
k∈K
{vi,k(P)}i∈N = v(P), ∀P ∈ P. (8)
The game G0,k is therefore a possible first stage game of the game G
∗, for which a unique
vector of welfare {wi(x)}i∈N has been selected for each strategy profile P ∈ P: either the vector
of a Nash equilibrium for P (condition (6)), or the worst possible outcome for every player if
there is no second stage equilibrium (condition (7)). The last condition (8) means that the
set of possible first stage games {G0,k}k∈K covers every possible combinations of second stage
equilibria, i.e. that whatever the rules of selection of the second stage equilibrium are, there
exists a first stage game G0,k that represents those rules. We are now able to properly define the
two-stage game equilibrium:
Definition 2.2. Let Γ be a game in normal form as defined in section 2.1, and {G0,k}k∈K its
set of first stage games. A strategy profile (x¯; P¯) ∈ X ×P is a subgame perfect P-equilibrium of
the two stage game G∗ if and only if:
• x¯ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium for P¯ of the game G,
4We consider here a case where there does not exist any equilibrium, even in mixed strategies.
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• there exists a first stage game G0,k such that:
(i) vk(P¯) = {ui(x¯|P¯)}i∈N ,
(ii) P¯ ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium of the game G0,k.
A subgame perfect P-equilibrium is therefore a strategy profile {x¯; P¯} ∈ X ×P of the two-
stage game G∗ such that (i) the players maximize simultaneously their utility functions ui(x|P¯),
and (ii) there exists a first game G0,k (in which x¯ ∈ X occurs among the possible Nash equilibria
for P¯) such that the strategy profile P¯ ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. when, ∀i ∈ N :
vi,k(P¯) ≥ vi,k(Pi; P¯−i), ∀Pi ∈ Pi. (9)
3 Stackelberg leadership and choice of one’s preferences
We show the two following results:
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a game in normal form as defined in section 2.1 and G∗ its associated
two-stages game. (x¯;W) ∈ X × P is a subgame perfect P-equilibrium of G∗ if and only if the
Nash equilibrium x¯ ∈ X is also a Stackelberg equilibrium when i is the leader, ∀i ∈ N .
Proposition 2. Let Γ be a game in normal form as defined in section 2.1, G∗ its associated
two-stages game, and x¯ ∈ X a Nash equilibrium of Γ. There always exists a set of preference
relations P¯ ∈ P such that {x¯; P¯} ∈ X ×P is a subgame perfect P-equilibrium.
The first result implies that, as soon as one player can improve her welfare by becoming a
Stackelberg leader, then there exists at least one player who will choose a preference relation P¯i
different from her welfare relation Wi, i.e. who will make a strategic commitment. The second
result means that, although the players will generally decide to maximize a different function
than their welfare function, they can always choose a set of preference relations P¯ such that they
play in fine a Nash equilibrium: this means in particular that the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in Γ ensures the existence of a subgame perfect P-equilibrium in the two-stage game G∗.
3.1 Stackelberg function
In order to show the proposition 1, we need to define a Stackelberg function. The Stackelberg
function of player i is her welfare function if she were a Stackelberg leader with (n−1) followers,
i.e. taking into account the best reply functions5 of the other players:
5It has to be noticed that our definition of a “best reply function” is more restrictive than the usual one, since
it already integrates the best reply functions of the other players but one.
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Definition 3.1. The function fj : Xi 7→ Xj is the best reply function of player j for P ∈ P if
and only if, ∀xi ∈ Xi:
uj(f1(xi); . . . ; fj(xi); . . . ; fn(xi)|Pj) ≥ uj(f1(xi); . . . ;xj ; . . . ; fn(xi)|Pj), ∀xj ∈ Xj , (10)
with fk : Xi 7→ Xk the best reply function of player k for P ∈ P, ∀k 6= i, j.
As soon as there exists a Nash equilibrium for P, we know that the best reply functions fj
for P are defined on a non empty subset of Xi. Indeed, if it was not the case, then a second
stage equilibrium could not exist, since x¯ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium for P if and only if:
fj(x¯i) = x¯j , ∀i, j ∈ N. (11)
We can now define the Stackelberg function:
Definition 3.2. Consider the game G as defined in section 2.1. Let fj(xi) denotes the best reply
function of player j for P ∈ P. The function Ψi : Xi 7→ R is the Stackelberg function of player
i if and only if:
Ψi(xi|P) = wi(f1(xi); . . . ; fn(xi)). (12)
A Stackelberg function is therefore the welfare function of player i which integrates the best
reply function of the players j 6= i as a function of the strategy xi.
Consider now a first stage game G0,k. We look for the conditions under which W can be a
first stage equilibrium, i.e. the players decide to directly maximize their welfare function, and
not another utility function. A set of preference relations P¯ ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium of G0,k
if and only if, ∀i ∈ N , ∀Pi ∈ Pi:
vi,k(P¯) ≥ vi,k(Pi; P¯−i), (13)
⇐⇒ ∃x¯ ∈ X (P¯), ∃x˜ ∈ X (Pi; P¯i), wi(x¯) ≥ wi(x˜). (14)
Since x¯(P) is a Nash equilibrium for P, we have ∀i ∈ N :
fj(x¯i) = x¯j , ∀j ∈ N. (15)
We can therefore rewrite the condition (14) as follows, ∀i ∈ N , ∀Pi ∈ Pi:
8
wi(f1(x¯i); . . . ; fn(x¯i)|x¯ ∈ X (P¯)) ≥ wi(f1(x˜i); . . . ; fn(x˜i)|x˜ ∈ X (Pi; P¯i)), (16)
⇐⇒ Ψi(x¯i|x¯ ∈ X (P¯)) ≥ Ψi(x˜i|x˜ ∈ X (Pi; P¯i)). (17)
The condition (17) means that choosing one’s preference relation Pi implies choosing the
strategy profile x¯i ∈ Xi that maximizes the Stackelberg function Ψi(xi), knowing the preference
relations of the other players.
A direct corollary of this result is that, if a player can improve her welfare by becoming a
Stackelberg leader — knowing that the other players are maximizing their welfare functions —
thenW cannot be a first stage equilibrium, and therefore at least one player will not maximize her
own welfare in the second stage game G. Furthermore, if there exists a Nash equilibrium which
is also a Stackelberg equilibrium when i is the leader, ∀i ∈ N , then no player have an interest in
changing unilaterally her preference relation, and the players can decide to play the second stage
game according to their welfare relation Wi. There can however exist in this configuration other
set of preference relations P¯ which are first stage equilibrium, and therefore subgame perfect
P-equilibria which are not Nash equilibria (this is the case of the prisoner’s dilemma we will
present in section 3.3). We have therefore shown the proposition 1.
3.2 Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect P-equilibrium
Although the players generally decide to maximize a different function than their own welfare
function, we show in this section that there always exists a first stage equilibrium P¯ ∈ P such
that the players play a Nash equilibrium in the second stage game G: if there exists a Nash
equilibrium x¯ ∈ X for the game Γ, then there exists P¯ ∈ P such that (x¯; P¯) ∈ X × P is a
subgame perfect P-equilibrium for the game G∗.
Let x¯ ∈ X be a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ. For all players but i, consider the following
preference relations Pj , ∀j ∈ −i:
(x¯j , x−j)Pj(xj , x−j) ∀xj ∈ Xj , x−j ∈ X−j . (18)
This means that, whatever the strategies played by the other players are, player j will always
rank x¯j as her preferred strategy. In this situation, since having a first mover advantage cannot
help player i to get a higher level of welfare (the other players will not change their strategy),
she chooses a preference relation Pi ∈ Pi such that the second stage equilibrium maximizes
her welfare function, i.e. such that the second stage equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium x¯. In
particular, if she chooses P¯i such that:
(x¯i, x−i)Pi(xi, x−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈ X−i, (19)
then we can see that no other player will have an interest in changing unilaterally her pref-
erence relation. This means that, if there exists a Nash equilibrium x¯ ∈ X in the game G, then
(x¯; P¯) ∈ X ×P is a subgame perfect P-equilibrium if:
(x¯i, x−i)Pi(xi, x−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi, x−i ∈ X−i, ∀i ∈ N. (20)
We have therefore shown the proposition 2.
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3.3 Illustrations
We now consider the case of several standard games in order to highlight the relevance of our
framework. We firstly present an analysis of symmetric 2 × 2 games, before providing a more
complete analysis of games with continuous strategy sets in the next section.
Consider a symmetric 2× 2 game:
A2 B2
A1 (R;R) (S;T)
B1 (T;S) (P;P)
For convenience, we will consider that the welfare relation is an ordinal one (we cannot
therefore aggregate the welfare of the players in a single function), and that mixed strategies are
not allowed. In this situation, for each player i, there exists 4 different preference relations in
Pi, i.e.:
• Pi,AA = {(Ai;A−i); (Ai;B−i)}: player i always prefers the strategy Ai;
• Pi,BB = {(Bi;A−i); (Bi;B−i)}: player i always prefers the strategy Bi;
• Pi,AB = {(Ai;A−i); (Bi;B−i)}: player i prefers the strategy Ai if and only if player −i
plays A−i;
• Pi,BA = {(Bi;A−i); (Ai;B−i)}: player i prefers the strategy Ai if and only if player −i
plays B−i.
We can therefore notice that, as long as one of the player chooses either Pi,AA or Pi,BB ,
there necessarily exists a unique second stage equilibrium. If both players choose either Pi,AB or
Pi,BA, then there are two second stage equilibria. And if one player chooses Pi,AB and the other
Pi,BA, then there is no second stage equilibrium. In those latter cases, both players therefore
anticipate their worst payoff M = min{R;T ;P ;S}.
For any symmetric 2× 2 game, we can therefore define 4 possible first stage games, according to
the second stage equilibrium selected when both players want either to play the same strategy
or not:
P2,AA P2,BB P2,AB P2,BA
P1,AA (R;R) (S;T) (R;R) (S;T)
P1,BB (T;S) (P;P) (P;P) (T;S)
P1,AB (R;R) (P;P) (P;P) (M;M)
P1,BA (T;S) (S;T) (M;M) (T;S)
P2,AA P2,BB P2,AB P2,BA
P1,AA (R;R) (S;T) (R;R) (S;T)
P1,BB (T;S) (P;P) (P;P) (T;S)
P1,AB (R;R) (P;P) (P;P) (M;M)
P1,BA (T;S) (S;T) (M;M) (S;T)
P2,AA P2,BB P2,AB P2,BA
P1,AA (R;R) (S;T) (R;R) (S;T)
P1,BB (T;S) (P;P) (P;P) (T;S)
P1,AB (R;R) (P;P) (R;R) (M;M)
P1,BA (T;S) (S;T) (M;M) (T;S)
P2,AA P2,BB P2,AB P2,BA
P1,AA (R;R) (S;T) (R;R) (S;T)
P1,BB (T;S) (P;P) (P;P) (T;S)
P1,AB (R;R) (P;P) (R;R) (M;M)
P1,BA (T;S) (S;T) (M;M) (S;T)
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We now identify the subgame perfect P-equilibria of cooperation and coordination games:
Prisoner’s dilemma: T > R > P > S; for both players, we have Wi = Pi,BB . The strategy
profile (P1,BB ;P2,BB) is always a Nash equilibrium in the first stage game; (P1,AB ;P2,AB) is
also a Nash equilibrium in the last two games (i.e. when the second stage equilibrium is joint
cooperation). It means that whatever the beliefs of the players about the possible second stage
equilibria are, joint defection can be played in the second stage game; and that since there exists
a rule of selection6 of the second stage equilibrium such that conditional cooperation is a Nash
equilibrium in the first stage game, then joint cooperation can also be played in the second stage
game.
This theoretical prediction seems to be quite more realistic than the systematic defection pre-
dicted by the standard theory: our framework predicts that, in order to maximize one’s own
welfare, we can either unilaterally defect in every circumstances, or choose to become a condi-
tional cooperator, i.e. to cooperate if and only if the other player cooperates too. An interesting
point here is that the mechanism of reciprocity — which is quite natural in a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma — seems also to be effective even without the repetition of the game. There exists there-
fore two subgame perfect P-equilibria: ((B1;B2); (P1,BB ;P2,BB)) and ((A1;A2); (P1,AB ;P2,AB)).
Hi-Lo: R > P > T = S; for both players, we have Wi = Pi,AB . The strategy profiles
(P1,AA;P2,AA) and (P1,BB ;P2,BB) are Nash equilibria in each first stage games, and (P1,AB ;P2,AB)
is also a Nash equilibrium in the last two games (i.e. when the second stage equilibrium is joint
cooperation). It implies that the two Nash equilibria in pure strategies can be played in the
second stage game (this confirms our proposition 2). However, we can notice that the preference
relation Pi,BB is weakly dominated by Pi,AB , ∀i ∈ N : this means that if we assume that the play-
ers do not play weakly dominated strategies, then they will never commit themselves to play Bi
in any circumstances, and will therefore be able to select the pareto dominant Nash equilibrium.
Our framework of the choice of one’s preferences can therefore help to solve some coordination
issues, since it appears that we do not need strong assumptions about individuals’ rationality
(such as a rule of selection of equilibrium) in order to explain the selection of the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium: we only need to assume that rational players will not play weakly dominated
strategies in the first stage game. There exists therefore three subgame perfect P-equilibria:
((A1;A2); (P1,AA;P2,BB)), ((B1;B2); (P1,BB ;P2,BB)), and ((A1;A2); (P1,AB ;P2,AB)).
4 Continuous strategy sets
In this section, we consider games with continuous strategy sets and investigate the conditions
under which the players choose cooperative preferences. We firstly establish a link between
supermodularity (respectively submodularity) and cooperation (competition) in the second stage
game of two players games, and illustrate our results with a two-players collective action game.
4.1 Supermodularity and cooperation
We introduce the following notations and definitions:
6It is here sufficient that both players believe that two conditional cooperators — who know that they are
both conditional cooperators — will always cooperate.
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• The partial derivatives of a function hi : Y 7→ Z are noted (the index i designates to whom
player is associated the function h, and the index j and k the successive derivatives of the
function hi according to the strategy of the players j and k):
hjki (y) =
∂2hi
∂yj∂yk
(y1; . . . ; yn). (21)
• For a given n × n matrix S ∈ Rn×n, Sij denotes a (n − 1) × (n − 1) matrix that results
from deleting row i and column j of S.
• For a given n× n matrix S ∈ Rn×n, CSij = (−1)i+j |Sij | denotes the (i; j) cofactor of S.
• The game Γ defined in section 2.1 is supermodular (respectively submodular) if and only
if, ∀i ∈ N , the welfare functions wi are of class C2 and:
wiji (x) ≥ (≤)0 ∀x ∈ X, ∀j 6= i. (22)
For convenience, we will assume in this section that the set of possible preference relations in
the first stage game is limited to the set of preference relations whose associated utility functions
can be described as linear combinations of the welfare functions wi. The possible utility functions
of an individual are therefore of the following form, ∀i ∈ N :
ui(x|Si) =
∑
j∈N
σijwj(x), (23)
with Si = {σij}i∈N the set of weighting parameters of player i, i.e. the weight she gives to
the other players in her preferences. In this restricted framework, each player chooses in the first
stage game a vector of parameters Si ∈ Rn, and then maximizes in the second stage game a
weighted sum of the welfare functions of all players. We investigate in this section the conditions
under which the players choose positive parameters in the first stage game in order to maximize
their welfare function, i.e. when the possiblity of choosing one’s preferences generates coopera-
tion.
For matters of simplicity, we make the following assumptions about the game G, ∀i ∈ N :
• the welfare function wi(x) is of class C3;
• the utility function ui(x|Si) is quasiconcave in xi, ∀Si ∈ Rn;
• the Stackelberg function Ψi(x|S) is quasiconcave in xi, ∀S = {Si}i∈N ∈ Rn×n.
A direct implication of these assumptions is that, ∀S ∈ Rn×n, there exists at least one second
stage equilibrium x¯(S) ∈ X. We also assume that the second stage equilibrium x¯ : Rn×n 7→ X
is of class C2. We can check that, for n = 2, those conditions are verified when the welfare
functions wi are quadratic and concave.
We now assume that at each second stage game equilibrium x¯(S) ∈ X, ∀i 6= j, the first
order derivatives wji (x¯) and w
i
j(x¯) (if non null) have the same sign (as in a Cournot oligopoly for
instance). We show the following results:
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Proposition 3. Let Γ be a two-players game in normal form as defined in section 4.1. If the
game Γ is submodular, then at least one player will choose a negative weight for the welfare
function of the other player in her utility function at the first stage equilibrium of the two stages
game G∗.
Proposition 4. Let Γ be a two-players game in normal form as defined in section 4.1. If the
game Γ is supermodular, then both players will choose a positive weight for the welfare function
of the other player in their utility functions at the first stage equilibrium of the two stages game
G∗.
Proposition 3 means that, if the players are able to make strategic commitments, then the
submodularity property of the game Γ will create competitive behaviours in the second stage
game (at the first stage equilibrium), although it is not certain that both players will choose a
spiteful motivation. It means that players will maximize their own welfare as well as the differ-
ence between their welfare and the welfare of the other player. Conversely, proposition 4 means
that the supermodularity property of the game Γ will generate cooperation in the second stage
game (at the first stage equilibrium).
Proof. Propositions 3 and 4 require quite similar proofs, and we will therefore use the same
reasoning for both. Our proof consists of three steps: (1) we firstly explicit the first order condi-
tions of the first and second stage game equilibria; (2) we then determine the best reply function
as defined in section 3.1; and (3) we focus on the case of two players games and show that the
supermodularity property of the game G is preserved for the second stage game at the first stage
equilibrium.
Step 1 : for any S ∈ Rn×n, the utility function ui(x|Si) is continuous in x and quasiconcave in
xi, ∀i ∈ N . There therefore exists a second stage equilibrium x¯ ∈ X that verifies, ∀i ∈ N :
uii(x¯|Si) = 0, (24)∑
j∈N
σijw
i
j(x¯) = 0. (25)
The second stage equilibrium x¯ : Rn×n 7→ X being of class C2 as well as the welfare function
wi(x), the indirect welfare function vi(S) is also of class C
2. As shown in the previous section,
maximizing the indirect welfare function in the first stage game is equivalent to maximizing the
Stackelberg function Ψi(x¯i(S)) evaluated at the second stage equilibrium. We have at the first
stage equilibrium:
∂vi
∂σij
(x¯i(S)) = Ψ
i
i(x¯i(S))
∂x¯i
∂σij
(σi1; . . . ;σin) = 0, ∀j ∈ N. (26)
We must therefore verify at the first stage equilibrium:
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either
∂x¯i
∂σij
(σi1; . . . ;σin) = 0, ∀j ∈ N, (27)
or Ψii(x¯i(S)) = 0, ∀x¯i ∈ Xi. (28)
We suggest now highlighting that the condition (27) is quite uncommon, and that we can
reasonably assume that the condition (26) is verified if and only if (28) is verified. We need
therefore to characterize the second stage equilibrium x¯ ∈ X. Since we assumed the existence
of a twice differentiable solution for (25), we identify the best reply of player i, ∀i 6= j, when
a player j unilaterally changes her parameters σj.. We consider here the differential of u
i
i, and
look for the reactions dxi that verify du
i
i(x¯) = 0, ∀i ∈ N . We have the following relations:
duii(x¯) = 0, ∀i ∈ N, (29)∑
j∈N
[
uiji (x¯) dxj + w
i
j(x¯) dσij
]
= 0, ∀i ∈ N. (30)
We solve this system of linear equations in dxi:
u111 (x¯) . . . u1n1 (x¯). . . . . .
un1n (x¯) . . . u
nn
n (x¯)
dx1. . .
dxn
+
∑j∈N w1j (x¯) dσ1j. . .∑
j∈N w
n
j (x¯) dσnj
 = 0, (31)
J dx+ dA = 0, (32)
with dx = t{dxi}i∈N the column vector of strategies’ variations; dA = t{dAi}i∈N ; and J the
n× n Jacobian matrix (evaluated at the second stage equilibrium) of the function ∂u : X 7→ Rn
that associates to any strategy profile x ∈ X the marginal utility function of each player. We
make the assumption that J and its minors Jii are generically non singular ∀S ∈ Rn×n. The
system (32) is therefore a Cramer system and the unique solution is given by:
dxi =
∣∣J i∣∣
|J | ∀i ∈ N, (33)
with J i a n× n matrix identical to J , except for the ith column which is replaced by −dA.
We deduce the following relations:
dxi = −
∑
k∈N C
J
ki dAk
|J | , (34)
=⇒ ∂x¯i
∂σik
(S) = − wik
CJii
|J | (x¯(S)) ∀S ∈ R
n×n. (35)
We can therefore see the condition (27) implies:
wik(x¯) = 0 ∀k ∈ N. (36)
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This last condition means that the strategy profile that maximizes the utility function of
player i also maximizes her own welfare function wi as well as the welfare of all the other players
j 6= i (or minimizes, according to the sign of the second order derivative). Since the condition
(27) is quite uncommon, we make the additional assumption that:
∂x¯i
∂σik
= 0, ∀k ∈ N =⇒ Ψii(x¯i(S)) = 0. (37)
We can therefore rewrite the first order condition of the first stage equilibrium (26):
∑
j∈N
wji (x¯i(S))f
i
j(x¯i(S)) = 0. (38)
For n = 2, the first order conditions of the first and second stage equilibrium are therefore:
{
σiiw
i
i(x¯) + σijw
i
j(x¯) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j,
wii(x¯(S)) + f
i
jw
j
i (x¯(S)) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
(39)
If we assume that each player gives a non null weight to her own welfare function (i.e. σii 6= 0),
we obtain:
σi = f
i
j
wij
wji
(x¯(S)), (40)
with σi =
σij
σii
. Since we assumed that wij and w
j
i have the same sign at the second stage
equilibrium, it means that σi has the same sign than f
i
j(x¯). Our purpose is to show under which
conditions the individuals will cooperate or not in the second stage game, and therefore to deter-
mine the sign of σi at the first stage equilibrium: we now must determine the best reply function
fj(xi).
Step 2 : we now determine fj(xi), the best reply functions as defined in section 3.1. Consider
that all players but i are maximizing their utility functions, i.e. that they play their best reply
strategy for xi; if player i changes her strategy such that dxi 6= 0, then, we must verify, ∀j 6= i
(the different functions are evaluated in (f1(xi); . . . ; fn(xi)), i.e. when all players but i maximize
their utility functions):
dujj(x) = 0, (41)
ujij dxi +
∑
k 6=i
ujkj dxk = 0. (42)
We can rewrite this system of linear equations with dx−i = t{dxk}k 6=i, andBi = t{ukik dxi}k 6=i:
Jii dx−i +Bi = 0. (43)
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Since we assume that Jii is non singular, the system (43) is a Cramer system and has a unique
solution, with Jjii a (n − 1) × (n − 1) matrix identical to J except for the column made of ukjk ,
∀k 6= i which is replaced by −Bi, and without row i and column i:
dxj =
∣∣∣Jjii∣∣∣
|Jii| . (44)
We can develop the determinant of Jjii (we arbitrarily suppose that i < j):
∣∣∣Jjii∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u111 . . . u
1,i−1
1 u
1,i+1
1 . . . u
1,j−1
1 −u1i1 dxi u1,j+11 . . . u1n1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ui−1,1i−1 . . . u
i−1,i−1
i−1 u
i−1,i+1
i−1 . . . u
i−1,j−1
i−1 −ui−1,ii−1 dxi ui−1,j+1i−1 . . . ui−1,ni−1
ui+1,11 . . . u
i+1,i−1
i+1 u
i+1,i+1
i+1 . . . u
i+1,j−1
i+1 −ui+1,ii+1 dxi ui+1,j+1i+1 . . . ui+1,ni+1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
un1n . . . u
n,i−1
n u
n,i+1
n . . . u
n,j−1
n −unin dxi un,j+1n . . . unnn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(45)
We can rewrite this determinant as follows:
∣∣∣Jjii∣∣∣ = − dxi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u111 . . . u
1,i−1
1 0 u
1,i+1
1 . . . u
1,j−1
1 u
1,i
1 u
k,j+1
k . . . u
1n
1
. . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ui−1,1i−1 . . . u
i−1,i−1
i−1 0 u
i−1,i+1
i−1 . . . u
i−1,j−1
i−1 u
i−1,i
i−1 u
i−1,j+1
i−1 . . . u
i−1,n
i−1
0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
ui+1,11 . . . u
i+1,i−1
i+1 0 u
i+1,i+1
i+1 . . . u
i+1,j−1
i+1 u
i+1,i
i+1 u
i+1,j+1
i+1 . . . u
i+1,n
i+1
. . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
un1n . . . u
n,i−1
n 0 u
n,i+1
n . . . u
n,j−1
n u
ni
n u
n,j+1
n . . . u
nn
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(46)
We can then invert the ith with the jth column, and we obtain:∣∣∣Jjii∣∣∣ = (−1)i+j |Jij |dxi. (47)
We can now rewrite the relation (44):
dxj =
CJij
CJii
(f1(xi); . . . ; fn(xi)) dxi. (48)
This last relation gives us the best reply of player j to a given variation of strategy of player
i in order to maximize her utility function when all the other players but i are maximizing their
utility functions. We can notice that the primitive of the best reply in terms of variation dxj is
the best reply function of player j, i.e. the strategy xj which maximizes the utility function uj
for a given strategy of player i, knowing the best reply of the other players k 6= i, j:
fj(xi) =
∫
CJij
CJii
(f1(xi); . . . ; fn(xi)) dxi. (49)
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For two players, we have therefore:
f ij(xi) = −
ujij
ujjj
(xi; fj(xi)). (50)
We can now show our proposition 3. Since the condition (40) implies that σi has the sign
of f ij(x¯i) at the first stage equilibrium, and since we assumed that ui is always quasiconcave in
xi, ∀i ∈ N , we know that the solution σ¯i has the same sign than ujij (x¯). Suppose that there
exists an equilibrium for which σ¯i > 0 ∀i ∈ N . If G is submodular, then we have wiji (x¯) < 0:
it implies that both functions uiji (x¯) and u
ji
j (x¯) are negative by construction. This contradicts
the positivity of the solution σ¯i assumed above. It means that at least one player put a negative
weighting on the welfare function of the other player in the second stage game at the first stage
game equilibrium: we have therefore shown our proposition 3. It is however not certain that both
players will put a negative weight on the welfare of the other player: it is indeed possible that a
player chooses a sufficiently negative weight such that the other decides to unilaterally cooperate:
the rationale of this equilibrium is that, since player i maximizes the difference between wi(x)
and wj(x), player j can benefit from maximizing wi(x) too (maximizing the difference like player
i would indeed lead to a deteriorated situation), and therefore relatively decreases the pressure
exerted on her welfare by the other player.
We can now notice that f ij(xi) (and then σi) will be positive at the first stage equilibrium if
the utility function ui is supermodular. We therefore study now the conditions under which the
supermodularity of the welfare function wi is preserved at the first stage equilibrium, i.e. under
which the utility function ui is supermodular too.
Step 3 : we now show that the supermodularity of the game G is preserved for the utility functions
at the first stage equilibrium. Let φi : R 7→ R denotes the best reply function of player i for the
first stage game, i.e. the function that maximizes the indirect utility function of player i for a
given strategy σj ∈ R. Thanks to the equation (49), we know that this best reply function is
(with V the Jacobian matrix of the marginal indirect welfare function):
φi(σj) =
∫
CVji
CVjj
(φi(σj);σj) dσj , (51)
V =
(
Ψiii
∂xi
∂σi
∂xi
∂σj
)
i,j∈N
. (52)
We have therefore:
φi(σj) =
∫
uiji
ujjj
wji
wij
(φi(σj);σj) dσj . (53)
We suggest now studying the function Φi(σi) = φi ◦φj(σi). We can indeed notice that a first
stage equilibrium (σ¯i)i∈N necessarily verifies:
Φi(σ¯i) = σ¯i, ∀i ∈ N. (54)
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The supermodularity is preserved for the utility functions if and only if7:
σ¯i ≥ −w
ij
i
wjij
(x¯(S¯)) ∀i, j ∈ N, j 6= i. (55)
We therefore suggest showing that Φi(σi) is bounded below by −w
ij
i
wjij
(x¯(σi;φj(σi))), ∀i ∈ N .
In this case, the condition (55) will indeed be verified, and the second stage game with the
utility functions u(x|S¯) will be supermodular. The supermodularity of the game G would then
imply that both players choose positive parameters σi ∈ R in the first stage game and therefore
cooperate in the second stage game.
We now determine the minimum of Φi : R 7→ R. Since we assume the continuity and quasi-
concavity of the Stackelberg function ∀S ∈ R2, we know that the best reply functions φi and
therefore Φi are continuous ∀σi ∈ R. The minimum of Φi can therefore be reached only for
σi → ±∞ or for σi such that Φii(σi) = 0. The condition (40) implies that:
lim
σi→∞
φj(σi) = 0, (56)
=⇒ lim
σi→∞
Φi(σi) = −
wjij
wjjj
wji
wij
(x¯(σi, 0)). (57)
The relation (57) implies that, if G is supermodular, then Φi is positive by construction when
σi → ±∞.
Consider now the first order derivative of Φi:
Φii(σi) = φ
j
i (φj(σi))φ
i
j(σi), (58)
Φii(σi) =
uiji
ujjj
(φ(σi);φj(σi))
ujij
uii
(σi;φj(σi)) (59)
The minimum of Φi can therefore be reached for:
• σ˜i such that ujij (σi;φj(σi)) = 0, i.e. such that φj(σ˜i) = −
wjij
wiji
(σi;φj(σi)). We would have
in this case Φi(σ˜i) = 0;
• σ˜i such that uiji (φ(σi;φj(σi)) = 0, i.e. such that Φi(σ˜i) = −
wjij
wiji
(σi);φj(σi)).
We have shown that the possible minima for Φi(σi) are all greater than −w
ji
j
wiji
(x¯(σi;φj(σi))).
This condition is therefore also verified at the first stage equilibrium:
σ¯i ≥ −
wjij
wiji
(x¯(σ¯i;φj(σ¯i))). (60)
7For convenience, we make the assumption that wiji (x¯) 6= 0, ∀i, j ∈ N .
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The supermodularity of the game is therefore preserved at the first stage equilibrium, i.e.
when the players decide to maximize the utility functions ui(x|S¯). Both players will therefore
choose positive weightings σi and cooperate in the second stage game. We have therefore shown
our proposition 4.
4.2 Collective action game
We now consider as an illustration a two-players collective action game Γ = 〈{1; 2};R+ ×
R+; {w1;w2}〉, with the following welfare functions:
wi(q) = aQ+
b
2
Q2 − c
2
q2i , a, c > 0 and 4b < c, (61)
with qi ∈ R+, Q = (q1 + q2) if b ≥ 0 and Q = min{(q1 + q2); |a/b|} if b < 0 (this last condition
ensures that the function B(Q) is always increasing). We have therefore a collective action game,
in which both players contribute to a collective benefit and support individual costs. We now
assume that both players choose their utility function in a first stage game as a weighted sum of
the welfare functions. We have therefore, ∀i ∈ N :
ui(q|σii, σij) = σiiwi(q) + σijwj(q). (62)
We can easily check that σii = 0 cannot be a first stage equilibrium (if b > 0, player i produces
qi → +∞ and gets her worst level of welfare; if b < 0, player i produces qi = |a/b| and supports
all the costs). We normalize therefore each parameter σii by 1, and consider the following utility
functions, ∀i ∈ N , j 6= i:
ui(q|σi) = (1 + σi)(aQ+ b
2
Q2)− c
2
q2i − σi
c
2
q2j . (63)
A strategy profile q¯ ∈ R+ × R+ is a second stage equilibrium if and only if (we assume the
existence of an interior solution q¯i > 0, ∀i ∈ N), ∀i ∈ N :{
(1 + σi)(a+ bQ¯)− cq¯i = 0,
(1 + σi)b− c ≤ 0.
(64)
We obtain the following solutions for the second stage game:
q¯i(σ1, σ2) =
a(1 + σi)
c− (2 + σ1 + σ2)b , (65)
Q¯(σ1, σ2) =
a(2 + σ1 + σ2)
c− (2 + σ1 + σ2)b . (66)
We can firstly check that at the second stage equilibrium, if b < 0 then we have well Q¯ <
|a/b|. We can then deduce the partial derivative of the indirect welfare function vi(σ1, σ2) =
wi(q¯(σ1, σ2)):
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∂vi
∂σi
(σ¯1, σ¯2) =
a2c(b(1 + σ¯1)(1 + σ¯2)− cσ¯i)
(c− (2 + σ¯1 + σ¯2)b)3 = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (67)
We get the following symmetric solutions at the first stage equilibrium:
σ¯1 = σ¯2 =
c− 2b−√c(c− 4b)
2b
, (68)
σ¯′1 = σ¯
′
2 =
c− 2b+√c(c− 4b)
2b
. (69)
We can check that only the solution (68) verifies the positivity of qi, and is then an interior
solution. Moreover, we can check that the indirect welfare function is concave, whatever the sign
of b is. We obtain therefore a unique subgame perfect P-equilibrium (q¯; S¯) ∈ {R+}2 × R2:

q¯i =
2ab− c+√c(c− 4b)
2b
√
c(c− 4b) , ∀i ∈ N,
σ¯i =
c− 2b−√c(c− 4b)
2b
, ∀i ∈ N.
(70)
We can notice that the parameters σ¯i have the same sign than the parameter b, i.e. that
players will play cooperatively — and produce a higher output than at Nash equilibrium — if
and only if the game is supermodular, even if the cooperation is not full (we have indeed σ¯i < 1).
We can finally check that the profits of both players are superior to the profits at Nash equilibrium
if and only if the game is supermodular. Conversely, for a game with a concave benefit function
(b < 0), the players will be more competitive at the first stage equilibrium and will therefore
get a lower outcome. Indeed, with a concave benefit function (i.e. with strategic substitutes),
each player has an incentive to ”blackmail” the other one — i.e. to unilaterally decrease her own
output — in order to force the other player to increase her output. Since both players have the
same logic, they enter in a vicious circle and end up with a deteriorated situation.
5 Conclusion
There exists a large literature on the possibility of making strategic commitments in games, but
they generally focus on a specific type of commitment such as payoff distortions. We therefore
suggested reasoning directly on the underlying preference relations of the players, and not only
on their welfare functions. This enabled us to develop a more general framework of strategic
commitment, in which we did not need any more a cardinal notion of utility. We argued that the
rational choice of one’s preferences is a consequence of individual rationality, and that a subgame
perfect P-equilibrium probably offers a more accurate representation of a rational behaviour than
Nash equilibrium: the former corresponds to a strategy profile for which the individuals have
maximized their welfare, knowing that the other players want also to maximize their welfare,
whereas the latter is a strategy profile for which the individuals have maximized their welfare,
knowing the strategy of the other players. Since it is the objective of welfare maximization
which is common knowledge, and not the effective strategy implemented in order to maximize
one’s welfare, a subgame perfect P-equilibrium is probably a more relevant notion than a Nash
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equilibrium for modelling rational behaviour. In particular, our framework can explain why —
without any communication between the players — a player can unilaterally cooperate in a pris-
oner’s dilemma, or how players can coordinate themselves in a Hi-Lo game, by adding the simple
assumption that players do not play weakly dominated strategies in the first stage game.
We provided in this paper a general framework for the choice of one’s preferences, without any
restriction on the set of preferences the individual can choose. In particular, this implies that
if the preferences of the players of a subgame perfect P-equilibrium can be implemented thanks
to a specific mechanism (such as contract with third parties), then this strategy profile should
be an equilibrium in this restricted framework. Proposition 1 indicates that the players choose
their preferences so that their satisfaction place them in a position of Stackelberg leadership.
This means that a subgame perfect P-equilibrium can be understood as a kind of Stackelberg
disequilibrium. This explains our propositions 3 and 4, i.e. that the supermodularity structure
of the game will generate cooperation, whereas submodularity will generate competition. Our
framework can therefore give a theoretical justification to competitive behaviours — maximizing
the difference between the outcomes for instance — since the best response of the other players
can in fine increase the welfare of the competitive player. Our proposition 2 can seem a bit
paradoxical, since it appears that, despite the fact that the players will generally choose a pref-
erence relation different from their welfare relation, if there exists a Nash equilibrium x¯ ∈ X in
the game Γ, then there always exists a set of preference relations P¯ ∈ P such that (x¯; P¯) is a
subgame perfect P-equilibrium: it is indeed sufficient that the preferences of the players define
x¯ as an equilibrium in dominant strategies. The introduction of a rational choice of preferences
therefore extends the set of solutions of the game. It should however be noticed that such a
preference relation is quite likely to be weakly dominated by an other preference relation, such
as for instance Wi in the Hi-Lo game.
Unlike strategic delegation or the indirect evolutionary approach which study the possible strate-
gic commitments for a given method of commitment (either a contract or a selection over the time
according to the efficiency of specific preferences), we suggested studying the possible strategic
commitments that could be beneficial to the players without any restriction on the set of avail-
able preferences. It will therefore be interesting for future research to define mechanisms that
would enable the implementation of a subgame perfect P-equilibrium.
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